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DOOMSDAY DELAYED: HOW THE COURT'S PARTY-
NEUTRAL CLARIFICATION OF CLASS
CERTIFICATION STANDARDS IN WAL-MART
V. DUKES ACTUALLY HELPS PLAINTIFFS
Anthony F. Fata*
INTRODUCTION
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes1 impacts all class certification deci-
sions. Even though Dukes involved a Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive relief
class and a gender discrimination claim, the courts have subsequently
applied Dukes to Rule 23(b)(3) class actions in cases involving anti-
trust, breach of contract, wage and hour acts, product defect, product
liability, Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), due
process, and other statutory claims. While the Dukes Court focused
primarily on Rule 23(a)(2)'s commonality requirement and Rule
23(b)(2)'s injunctive relief requirement, it also addressed principles
that impact every requirement under Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b), such
as the "rigorous analysis" standard and the admissibility-and persua-
siveness-of evidence offered in Rule 23 proceedings. Dukes and the
cases interpreting it suggest four principles.
First, plaintiffs must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,
compliance with the Rule 23 requirements. Plaintiffs' evidence in sup-
port of these requirements, and defendants' evidence in rebuttal, must
comply with the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE).
Second, a court may, when necessary, conduct a "preliminary" in-
quiry into certain aspects of the merits to determine whether the Rule
23 requirements are satisfied, but it cannot rule on the merits or base
the class certification decision on who it believes will prevail on the
underlying substantive claim.
Third, "common questions" for purposes of Rule 23(a)(2) are lim-
ited to outcome-determinative questions, and "commonality" centers
* Partner, Cafferty Clobes Meriwether & Sprengel LLP. Cafferty Clobes Meriwether &
Sprengel LLP represents plaintiffs in class actions in federal and state courts nationwide through
its offices in Chicago, Philadelphia, and Ann Arbor. It also represents plaintiffs and defendants
in nonclass litigation arising from business disputes and regulatory matters.
1. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
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on whether the defendant engaged in substantially uniform conduct
that yielded a substantially similar impact on class members.
Finally, although Dukes narrowed the universe of "common" ques-
tions properly considered under Rule 23(a)(2), it did not alter Rule
23(b)(3)'s requirement that common questions "predominate" over
questions affecting only individual members of the class. However,
because Dukes discussed the Rules Enabling Act and defendants'
right to assert affirmative defenses, such defenses may now play a
more prominent role in the Rule 23(b)(3) analysis. On the other
hand, the Dukes Court's rejection of the "Trial by Formula" method
of ascertaining damages has had no impact on the well-settled rule
that even complex individual damage determinations for class mem-
bers will not defeat predominance.
II. "RIGOROUS ANALYSIS" FOCUSES ON ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE
In reiterating the rigorous analysis standard originally set forth in
General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon2 nearly thirty years
earlier, the Dukes Court confirmed that a class certification proponent
must "affirmatively demonstrate his compliance" with Rule 23, which
means "he must be prepared to prove" with facts each of the applica-
ble Rule 23 requirements. 3 Thus, "[a]ctual, not presumed, conform-
ance with Rule 23(a) remains ... indispensible."'4 Accordingly, in the
class action context, it is now clearer than ever that evidence is just as
important as argument, if not more so.
While Dukes addressed this standard in the context of Rule
23(a)(2)'s "commonality" requirement, rigorous analysis will be ap-
plied to every applicable Rule 23 requirement. 5 Rigorous analysis,
however, is constrained by the specific terms of Rule 23. As the Sev-
enth Circuit has recognized, a court cannot impose new requirements
on plaintiffs that are not found in the language of Rule 23(a) and (b):
[A] district court's conclusion that it has a better idea does not jus-
tify disregarding the text of Rule 23. Policy about class actions has
been made by the Supreme Court through the mechanism of the
Rules Enabling Act. A district court is no more entitled to depart
from Rule 23 than it would be to depart from one of the Supreme
Court's decisions after deeming the Court's doctrine counter-
2. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982).
3. Dukes, 131'S. Ct. at 2551.
4. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160).
5. See, e.g., Creative Montessori Learning Ctrs. v. Ashford Gear LLC, 662 F.3d 913, 917-18
(7th Cir. 2011) (holding that adequacy of counsel under Rule 23(a)(4) did not survive a rigorous
analysis); George v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., No. 08 C 3799, 2011 WL 5118815, at *8 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 25, 2011) (holding that the class definition did not survive a rigorous analysis).
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productive. Rule 23 establishes a national policy for the Judicial
Branch; individual district judges are not free to prefer their own
policies. The Court made this point twice in its most recent Term. 6
A. The Federal Rules of Evidence Apply to Rule 23 Proceedings
The FRE are not limited to trials, but instead, under FRE 101, ap-
ply to all "proceedings," unless a specific exception applies.7 The spe-
cific exceptions listed in the FRE do not include Rule 23 proceedings
specifically or pretrial proceedings generally. 8 Moreover, in Mars
Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank N.A., the Seventh Circuit held, long
before Dukes, that the FRE apply to Rule 23 proceedings. 9 More re-
cently, in American Honda Motor Co. v. Allen, the Seventh Circuit
held that Rule 702 and Daubert apply to expert opinions offered on
class certification issues. 10
Despite Mars Steel, some district courts in the Seventh Circuit have
cited Eisen v. Carisle & Jacquelin11 for the proposition that the FRE
do not apply to Rule 23 proceedings because "a class action hearing of
necessity is not accompanied by the traditional rules and procedures
applicable to civil trials."'12 Thus, there appeared to be some confu-
sion among the district courts in the Seventh Circuit.
Speculation as to whether Eisen permits a lesser evidentiary stan-
dard on class certification was seemingly put to rest in Dukes. The
parties in Dukes disputed whether the opinions of the plaintiffs' ex-
pert regarding class certification had to satisfy FRE 702 and Daubert,
and the district court held that neither applied to the issue of class
certification. In response, the Supreme Court stated, "We doubt that
is S0.''13 While the Supreme Court did not hold that the FRE apply to
Rule 23, its "doubt" clearly indicates that they do.
More recently, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Comcast
Corp. v. Behrend to address the following issue: "Whether a district
6. In re Aqua Dots Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 748, 751-52 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).
The court in In re Aqua Dots Products Liability Litigation held that the district court erred by
determining, under Rule 23(b)(3), that defendant's voluntary product recall was "superior" to
the class action device; while a voluntary recall may be a form of resolving the dispute, it is not a
form of "adjudicating"-the term employed in Rule 23(b)(3)-the dispute. Id.
7. See FED. R. EVID. 101.
8. See FED R. EvIo. 101, 1101.
9. See Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont'l Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 938 (7th Cir. 1989); see also Reed
v. Advocate Health Care, 268 F.R.D. 573, 594 n.20 (N.D. I11. 2009).
10. Am. Honda Motor Co. v. Allen, 600 F.3d 813, 815-16 (7th Cir. 2010).
11. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974).
12. Lively v. Dynegy, Inc., No. 05-CV-63-MJR, 2007 WL 685861, at *12 (S.D. I11. Mar. 2, 2007)
(citing Eisen, 417 U.S. at 178).
13. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553-54 (2011).
2013]
DEPA UL LAW REVIEW
court may certify a class action without resolving whether the plaintiff
class has introduced admissible evidence, including expert testimony,
to show that the case is susceptible to awarding damages on a [class-
wide] basis."' 14 The Supreme Court reversed class certification under
Rule 23(b)(3), finding that the evidence was properly admitted (de-
fendant waived its objection to admissibility), but holding that the evi-
dence did not demonstrate that damages could be measured on a
classwide basis.15
In Messner v. Northshore University HealthSystem, the Seventh Cir-
cuit cited Dukes and American Honda, explaining that, when expert
evidence "is critical to class certification," the "district court must
make a conclusive ruling on any challenge" to the evidence "before it
may rule on a motion for class certification." 16 "Critical to class certi-
fication," means "expert testimony important to an issue decisive for
the motion for class certification," and any doubts as to whether evi-
dence is critical to class certification must be resolved by a conclusive
evidentiary ruling.' 7 "Failure to conduct an analysis when necessary
... would mean that the unreliable testimony remains in the record, a
result that could easily lead to a reversal on appeal."18 Therefore, it is
unacceptable for a trial court to admit potentially inadmissible evi-
dence in a class certification proceeding.19 Although this previous ap-
proach is "a time-honored and often acceptable approach toward
many difficult evidentiary issues when the judge is the trier of fact[, it]
does not suffice ... when the expert testimony is in fact critical to class
certification." 20 Rather, "[t]hose tough questions must be faced and
squarely decided" before a class certification decision is reached.21
Following Dukes, courts have applied the FRE to Rule 23 proceed-
ings. In Hawkins v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc., for example,
the trial court noted that the defendant's evidence in support of its
argument that a proposed class representative's prior bad acts ren-
dered her "inadequate" under Rule 23(a)(4)'s "adequacy" require-
ment was likely inadmissible under FRE 403 and 608(b). 22 Similarly,
in Boyd v. Alutiiq Global Solutions, LLC, a case involving the collec-
14. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, No. 11-864, 2012 WL 113090, at *1 (U.S. June 25, 2012).
15. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1431-35 (2013).




19. See id. at 813.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See Hawkins v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc., 280 F.R.D. 388, 395 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
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tive action provision in the Fair Labor Standards Act that is analogous
to Rule 23, the trial court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that "strin-
gent application of the FRE is inappropriate at this stage in the litiga-
tion" and held that declarations addressing the issue of commonality
were based on inadmissible hearsay and speculation. 23 Thus, after
Dukes, litigants should assume that evidence offered in a Rule 23 pro-
ceeding must comply with the FRE.
B. Defendants' Evidence Must Also Comply with the FRE
The FRE apply equally to defendant's evidence against class certifi-
cation. In Messner, the Seventh Circuit held that the trial court erred
when it did not conclusively rule on the plaintiffs' request to bar de-
fendant's evidence. 24 On appeal, the defendant argued that the FRE
apply on class certification only to plaintiffs, but not to defendants,
because "only plaintiffs bear the burden of satisfying Rule 23's re-
quirements while defendants may present no evidence if they so
choose. ' 25 The Seventh Circuit rejected this "asymmetric rule" be-
cause the FRE "appl[y] to plaintiffs and defendants alike, regardless
of which side bears the burden of proof. The fact that a defendant is
not required to present evidence to defeat class certification does not
give that defendant license to offer irrelevant and unreliable
evidence. 26
More recently, in Johnson v. Meriter Health Services Employee Re-
tirement Plan,27 the Seventh Circuit rejected a defendant's argument
that intraclass conflicts precluded a finding of "adequacy of represen-
tation" under Rule 23(a)(4). Although the defendant presented
"some evidence" of intraclass conflicts, it failed to prove that those
conflicts were real, as opposed to merely "hypothetical. ' 28 The court
found that the defendant's contention that "some class members will
be hurt by class treatment rings hollow" because the defendant failed
to identify any class member who would be harmed by class treat-
ment. The defendant "either didn't look for such a class member,
which would be inexcusable, or it looked but didn't find one, which
would probably mean that there isn't any such class member. ' 29 Ac-
cordingly, speculative and unsupported arguments offered by defend-
23. Boyd v. Alutiiq Global Solutions, LLC, No. 11-CV-753, 2011 WL 3511085, at *5 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 8, 2011).
24. Messner, 669 F.3d at 813.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 813-14.
27. Johnson v. Meriter Health Servs. Emp. Ret. Plan, 702 F.3d 364 (7th Cir. 2012).




ants will not be accepted by the courts, even at the class certification
stage.
C. Rule 23 Evidence Need Not Be Admissible for the
Trial on the Merits
Although the FRE apply to class certification proceedings, the evi-
dence need not be in a form that would be admissible at trial. In In re
Zurn Pex Plumbing Products Liability Litigation, the Eighth Circuit,
citing Dukes, rejected defendants' argument that the district court
must "determine conclusively at an early [class certification] stage, not
just whether or not expert evidence is sufficient to support class certi-
fication under Rule 23, but also whether that evidence will ultimately
be admissible at trial."'30
In the employment discrimination context, class certification deci-
sions often rely on affidavits from either class members or the defen-
dant's employees. "Affidavits are ordinarily inadmissible at trials but
they are fully admissible in summary proceedings, including prelimi-
nary-injunction proceedings. ' 31 After Dukes, courts continue to rely
on pretrial evidence that may be inadmissible at trial.32
D. The "Preponderance of the Evidence" Burden
Applies to Rule 23
Dukes reiterated that plaintiffs bear the burden of proof on class
certification, but did not specify the burden-whether plaintiffs must
establish the Rule 23 requirements by "some evidence," a "prepon-
derance" of the evidence, "clear and convincing" evidence, or "abso-
lute certainty." The analysis in Dukes, however, suggests that a
"preponderance" of the evidence standard applies. When addressing
commonality, the Dukes Court weighed the plaintiffs' evidence of an
unwritten company-wide policy of gender discrimination against Wal-
Mart's evidence of written policies prohibiting gender discrimination
and the delegation of employment decisions to the discretion of store
managers. 33 The Court ultimately held that the plaintiffs' evidence
did not outweigh Wal-Mart's evidence.34 The plaintiffs' sociology ex-
30. In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Prods. Liab. Litig., 644 F.3d 604, 611 (8th Cir. 2011) (affirming
class certification premised in part on expert opinions that were based on preliminary, incom-
plete data made available during class certification discovery).
31. Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167, 1171 (7th Cir. 1997).
32. See, e.g., Ross v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 667 F.3d 900, 909 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that the
plaintiffs proved commonality through class member declarations, which indicated that the de-
fendant engaged in uniform failure to pay overtime compensation).
33. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553-57 (2011).
34. Id. at 2553.
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pert could not confirm whether his findings of a corporate culture of
"gender bias" impacted 99% of employment decisions, or less than
0.5%. 35 Similarly, the plaintiffs' other experts, a statistician and a la-
bor economist, did not ascertain whether their conclusions that men
received more favorable compensation and promotions was the prod-
uct of company-wide gender bias or isolated region- and store-specific
problems that weighed down the averages for women. 36 In addition,
the plaintiffs' class member declarations were too few and geographi-
cally isolated to support the assertion of a nationwide policy.37 Had
"some" evidence of the commonality requirement been sufficient, the
plaintiffs may have prevailed. If the Court had required "clear and
convincing evidence" or some higher burden, its analysis most likely
would have been more concise. Thus, it appeared that the standard
fell somewhere between the two-a preponderance of the evidence.
Before Dukes, the Seventh Circuit had never stated what standard
of proof applied to class certification. Some courts interpreted an ear-
lier Seventh Circuit decision, Szabo v. Bridgeport Machines, Inc.,35 as
requiring something less than a preponderance of the evidence.39 Af-
ter Dukes, however, the Seventh Circuit made clear that the prepon-
derance of the evidence standard applies to class certification:
"Plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that a proposed class satisfies
the Rule 23 requirements, but they need not make that showing to a
degree of absolute certainty. It is sufficient if each disputed require-
ment has been proven by a preponderance of the evidence."' 40 The
Seventh Circuit also stated that, notwithstanding the discretion af-
forded district courts under Rule 23, a class certification decision will
be reversed as an abuse when "the district court bases its discretionary
decision on ... a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence. ' 41 In
Messner, the Seventh Circuit reversed the denial of class certification,
reasoning that the district court had erroneously assessed the compet-
ing expert opinions concerning whether defendant's conduct had a
substantially similar impact on class members. 42
35. Id.
36. Id. at 2555.
37. Id. at 2556.
38. Szabo v. Bridgeport Machines, Inc., 249 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2001).
39. See, e.g., CE Design Ltd. v. Cy's Crabhouse N., Inc., 259 F.R.D. 135, 140 (N.D. Ill. 2009)
(rejecting the defendant's assertion that the "preponderance of the evidence" burden applies in
the Seventh Circuit).
40. Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 811 (7th Cir. 2012) (emphasis
added) (citation omitted).
41. Id.
42. See id. at 815-19.
2013]
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E. "Persuasiveness" Is Just as Critical as "Admissibility"
Since Dukes, courts have made it clear that, in addition to establish-
ing the admissibility of evidence, parties' evidence must meet a thresh-
old level of persuasiveness on the particular Rule 23 requirement. In
Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., for example, the Ninth Circuit held
that the district court erred when it "limited its analysis of whether
there was commonality to a determination of whether Plaintiff's evi-
dence on the point was admissible," without subsequently "judging
the persuasiveness of the evidence presented. '43
More recently, in Comcast, an antitrust case, the Supreme Court
held that plaintiffs' damages model was admissible because defendant
did not object to it under the FRE. 44 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court
held that the model failed to establish that damages could be mea-
sured on a classwide basis. The model assumed four theories of anti-
trust violations, but only one theory survived at the time of class
certification, and plaintiffs failed to present a new damages model that
isolated the one surviving theory.45
Similarly, in George v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., the district court
denied class certification after finding the defendants' expert to be
more persuasive than plaintiffs' expert concerning the propriety of the
particular criteria used to define the class. The plaintiffs brought a
class action under ERISA and defined the class as 401(k) plan partici-
pants whose investments in the subject securities performed worse
than two purportedly "prudent alternative" comparator funds offered
outside the plan. The court rejected the assertion by the plaintiffs'
expert that the prudent alternatives were appropriate comparators be-
cause Kraft's expert asserted that appropriate comparators were funds
already in the 401(k) plan.46 The court found that "plaintiffs here
have not yet established that the proper measure of loss in this case is
an alternative passive investment or that the [funds proposed by plain-
tiffs' expert] are the appropriate specific alternatives. '47 Referencing
Dukes, the court concluded that the plaintiffs bear the burden to "'af-
firmatively demonstrate' that the proposed class definition is appro-
priate" and concluded that the plaintiffs "cannot use class certification
as a back-door way of resolving this contested issue in their favor. '48
43. Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 982 (9th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added).
44. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1431 n.4 (2012).
45. Id. at 1434-35.
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Defendants too must demonstrate the persuasiveness of their evi-
dence against class certification. In Messner, for example, the Seventh
Circuit reversed the denial of class certification after rejecting the affi-
davit of a class member, which the defendant offered to show that the
class member was not injured by the defendant's conduct.49 The Sev-
enth Circuit concluded that "the barebones affidavit on which [defen-
dant] relies did not so thoroughly disprove [plaintiff's] claims as to
render any further evidence to the contrary pointless. '50 The Seventh
Circuit then cited the opinions of plaintiff's expert who demonstrated
that the class member was injured by defendant's conduct and sug-
gested that the class member retract its position and participate in the
class action. 51
F. Even "Undisputed" Rule 23 Criteria Must Be
Backed by Evidence
Messner suggests that plaintiffs need only prove "disputed" Rule 23
requirements by a preponderance of the evidence.5 2 Plaintiffs should
not, however, rest on a mere lack of dispute or defendant's concession
on a particular Rule 23 requirement. Even "undisputed" Rule 23 re-
quirements are subject to rigorous analysis under the court's indepen-
dent duty to assess the propriety of class certification. In Dukes, the
Court based its rigorous analysis in part on how the class certification
decision would adversely impact absent class members. 53 After
Dukes, the Seventh Circuit reiterated the well-settled principle that
the "rigorous analysis of a motion to certify a class is for the protec-
tion not of defendants alone but of the class members as well."'54 Trial
courts have thus demonstrated the necessity of analyzing even those
Rule 23 requirements that the defendant has conceded. 55 Accord-
ingly, plaintiffs should present evidence concerning every applicable
Rule 23 requirement, even those that defendants do not dispute.
49. Messner, 669 F.3d 802 at 824.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 824 n.13.
52. See id. at 814.
53. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2559 (2011).
54. CE Design Ltd. v. King Architectural Metals, Inc., 637 F.3d 721, 723 (7th Cir. 2011) (em-
phasis added).
55. See, e.g., Bailiff v. Vil. of Downers Grove, No. 11 C 3335, 2011 WL 6318953, at *2 (N.D.
Ill. Dec. 16, 2011) ("The [defendant] does not dispute that Plaintiff has satisfied the requirements
of Rule 23(a). Nevertheless, the court addresses each element pursuant to its independent obli-




III. THE RULE 23 PROCEEDINGS ARE NOT A DRESS
REHEARSAL FOR TRIAL
Dukes reiterates the rule, first announced in Falcon, that
"[f]requently [the] rigorous analysis will entail some overlap with the
merits of plaintiff's underlying claim" because the "class determina-
tion generally involves considerations that are enmeshed in the factual
and legal issues comprising the plaintiff's cause of action. ' 56 The com-
monality analysis in Dukes involved a weighing of the evidence to de-
termine whether plaintiffs could prove that Wal-Mart had an
unwritten, company-wide corporate policy of gender discrimination.
57
The unwritten policy was also an element of the class's substantive
claim, thus the Supreme Court's analysis might suggest that the class
certification procedure should involve predicting the outcome of the
substantive claim.
Rigorous analysis, however, does not mean that the court may pre-
dict the outcome on the merits under Rule 23. Doing so in a prelimi-
nary proceeding would be highly unusual, especially in the absence of
a jury, as required by the Seventh Amendment. As the Dukes Court
explained, the limited merits inquiry on class certification is a very
narrow one, focused exclusively on the procedural consideration at
hand. "Nor is there anything unusual about that consequence: The
necessity of touching aspects of the merits in order to resolve prelimi-
nary matters, e.g., jurisdiction and venue, is a familiar feature of litiga-
tion."'58 In a footnote, the Court cited Eisen to explain that, while
touching aspects of the merits is appropriate in some cases to deter-
mine whether the Rule 23 requirements are satisfied, a merits inquiry
"for any other pretrial purpose" is not.59 The appellate courts have
interpreted footnote six as narrowly prescribing the limits of the mer-
its inquiry on class certification to that which is absolutely critical to
determining whether the Rule 23 requirements are satisfied. 60 More
recently, in Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust
56. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 146, 160
(1982)).
57. Id. at 2553-57.
58. Id. at 2552 (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 2552 n.6.
60. See, e.g., Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d 182, 190 (3d Cir. 2011) ("[A]t the class
certification stage, we are precluded from addressing any merits inquiry unnecessary to making a
Rule 23 determination."); Costco Wholesale Co. v. Ellis, 657 F.3d 970, 983 n.8 (9th Cir. 2011)
("[Dukes] clarif[ied] that Rule 23 does not authorize a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a
suit for purposes other than determining whether certification was proper.").
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Funds,61 the Supreme Court reached the same conclusion: "Rule 23
grants courts no license to engage in free-ranging merits inquiries at
the certification stage. Merits questions may be considered to the ex-
tent-but only to the extent-that they are relevant to determining
whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for class certification are
satisfied. 62
After Dukes, in Messner, the Seventh Circuit expressly cautioned
that "the court should not turn the class certification proceedings into
a dress rehearsal for the trial on the merits. ' 63 The Seventh Circuit's
citation to its own pre-Dukes decisions indicates that Dukes does not
alter the rule that the merits determination never precedes the class
certification decision. 64 Rather, plaintiffs must only demonstrate that
their claims are "capable of proof" on the basis of common
evidence. 65
Other appellate courts have likewise held that class certification
proceedings should not be converted into mini-trials on the merits. 66
In Behrend, the Third Circuit addressed whether an expert's opinion
was admissible under the FRE: "[A]lthough the Supreme Court re-
cently hinted that Daubert may apply for evaluating expert testimony
at the class certification stage, it need not turn class certification into a
mini-trial. '67 The Supreme Court's observations simply "require a
district court to evaluate whether an expert is presenting a model that
could evolve to become admissible evidence [at trial]," but does not
require the "district court to determine if a model is perfect at the
certification stage. '68 Rather, at the certification stage, evidence must
be assessed "to determine whether the theory of proof is plausible"
61. Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, No. 11-1085, 2013 WL 691001 (U.S. Feb.
27, 2013).
62. Id. at *7 (citing Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2552 n.6).
63. Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 811 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing
Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2010)); Kohen v. Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co., 571 F.3d
672, 677 (7th Cir. 2009); Payton v. Cnty. of Kane, 308 F.3d 673, 677 (7th Cir. 2002)).
64. See, e.g., Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 686 (7th Cir. 2011) (rejecting the defendant's
suggestion that "class certification is proper only after the representative plaintiffs establish by a
preponderance of the evidence everything necessary to prevail" on the merits of their claim
because it was contradicted by "the decision, made in 1966, to separate class certification from
the decision on the merits" (citing Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974))); Osada v.
Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., No. 11 C 2856, 2012 WL 1050067, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2012)
("Although the certification inquiry may overlap somewhat with the merits of the case, the Sev-
enth Circuit is clear that courts should not refuse to certify a class on the belief that it will lose."
(citations omitted)).
65. Messner, 660 F.3d at 818.
66. See, e.g., Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d 182, 204 (3d Cir. 2011).




and "susceptible to proof at trial through available evidence common
to the class."' 69 As a practical matter, however, litigants will continue
to put their spin on the merits in class certification proceedings.
Policy considerations may also weigh on the court's decision. Some
suggest that class certification can coerce a defendant into settling oth-
erwise meritless claims.70 Such suggestions do not address the fact
that certified class actions have typically survived Rule 12 motions for
dismissal before the certification. Moreover, even after certification
defendants may invoke Rule 56 to avoid liability on substantive claims
that are not backed by evidence. On the other hand, it is self-evident
that the class action device is almost always the only way litigants can
vindicate their rights and hold defendants accountable for misconduct
in light of the high costs of litigation compared to individual recov-
eries.71 In light of these competing policy considerations, litigants will
likely continue to put their cases with the best merits forward when
addressing class certification.
IV. "COMMONALITY" FOCUSES ON QUESTIONS
THAT DRIVE THE CASE
All class actions must meet Rule 23(a)(2)'s "commonality" require-
ment, which requires "questions of law or fact common to the class."'72
Dukes is important because it recognized that "for purposes of Rule
23(a)(2) 'even a single common question' will do," but limited the uni-
verse of questions that may be considered. 73
A "common question" is one that involves a "common contention"
or "issue" that is "central to the validity" of each class member's
claim, "capable of class-wide resolution" in "one stroke," and will pro-
vide a "common answer[] apt to drive the resolution of the litiga-
69. Id. (quoting In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 324 (3d Cir. 2008))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
70. See, e.g., CE Design Ltd. v. King Architectural Metals, Inc., 637 F.3d 721, 723 (7th Cir.
2011).
71. See, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1443
(2010) ("[Slome plaintiffs who would not bring individual suits for the relatively small sums
involved will choose to join a class action."); Deposit Guaranty Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S.
326, 338 n.9 (1980) (noting that class actions allow claimants to vindicate rights when they would
otherwise "be unlikely to obtain legal redress at an acceptable cost"); CE Design Ltd., 637 F.3d
at 723 ("Denial of class certification may be as heavy a blow to the class as grant of certification
is to the defendant.").
72. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
73. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2556 (2011).
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tion. '' 74 In conducting the commonality analysis, subsequent cases in
the Seventh Circuit have focused on whether the defendant engaged
in uniform conduct that had a substantially similar impact on all class
members.
Uniform conduct is established when a defendant's conduct, by its
very nature, impacted the class, such as antitrust violations, misleading
advertisements, or false statements concerning securities. 75 Uniform
conduct may also be established through written policies, such as a
company policy, or a law or ordinance. 76 Finally, uniform conduct
may be established through unwritten policies, systemic practices, or
centralized decision making, as long as plaintiffs present evidence that
a common policy existed.77 Of course, when proof of an unwritten
policy is lacking, the courts will not find commonality. 78
74. Id. at 2551 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans &
Trust Funds, No. 11-1085, 2013 WL 691001, at *8 (U.S. Feb. 27, 2013) (noting that a "common
question" is one that involves "evidence common to the class")
75. See, e.g., Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 818-19 (7th Cir. 2012)
(antitrust claim).
76. See, e.g., Jacks v. DirectStat, USA, LLC, No. 10 CV 1707, 2012 WL 2374444, at *5 (N.D.
I11. June 19, 2012) (finding that, in wage and hour act litigation, "top-level corporate policies"
were sufficient to establish commonality notwithstanding the fact that employees worked in dif-
ferent offices for different supervisors); Bailiff v. Vil. of Downers Grove, No. II C 3335, 2011
WL 6318953, at *3 (N.D. I11. Dec. 16, 2011) (discussing a village ordinance that allegedly im-
posed an unconstitutional booking fee on arrestees).
77. See, e.g., Ross v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 667 F.3d 900, 909 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding that, in a
wage and hour act case, declarations from approximately 10% of class established that the em-
ployer had an unwritten policy of not paying overtime compensation to nonexempt employees);
McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding
that, in an employment discrimination case, plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence of an unwrit-
ten policy of race discrimination to satisfy commonality); Galvan v. NCO Fin. Sys., Inc., Nos. 11
C 3918, 11 C 4651, 2012 WL 3987643, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 2012) (finding that, in debt
collection practices litigation, plaintiffs satisfied commonality by establishing that allegedly un-
fair practices were the product of centralized decision making that impacted the entire class);
Williams-Green v. J. Alexander's Rests., Inc., 277 F.R.D. 374, 377 (N.D. 11. 2011) (finding that,
in a wage and hour act case, despite a restaurant chain's written policy of requiring all tips to be
distributed to employees, the company's financial records, party admissions, and class represen-
tative testimony established that it had an unwritten policy of retaining a portion of the tip pool).
78. See, e.g., Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2552-57 (finding that, in a Title VII gender discrimination
case, expert opinions of a sociologist, labor economist, and statistician, coupled with class mem-
ber declarations, failed to establish that Wal-Mart had an unwritten policy of gender discrimina-
tion); Bolden v. Walsh Constr. Co., 688 F.3d 893, 896-97 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding that, in a case
alleging employment discrimination, plaintiffs' statistical evidence was insufficient to establish a
common policy of race discrimination); Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Public Sch., 688 F.3d 481, 497-98
(7th Cir. 2012) (finding that, in a case alleging a school district's failure to properly educate
students with disabilities, evidence of a policy or systematic failure to identify children with disa-
bilities was entirely absent); Pa. Chiropractic Ass'n v. Blue Cross Blue Shield Ass'n, No. 09 C
5619, 2011 WL 6819081, at *9 (N.D. I11. Dec. 28, 2011) (finding commonality lacking in an ER-
ISA case brought on behalf of medical providers because the multiple defendants had varying,
dissimilar policies regarding claim denial appeal rights).
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A substantially similar impact is proven through evidence that the
defendant's conduct injured class members in the same basic way,
such as antitrust violations that cause customers to pay more, mislead-
ing advertisements that cause consumers to pay more, and false state-
ments in securities markets that cause investors to pay more.79 Some
variation on the impact will not defeat commonality. 80 Substantially
similar impact is not established, however, when a great number of
class members suffered no injury from defendant's conduct or when
the nature of the injury varies significantly from one class member to
another. 81
In Ross v. RBS Citizens, N.A., the Seventh Circuit addressed com-
monality and found that the facts were distinguishable from those in
Dukes. The case involved an unwritten policy to deny Charter One
bank employees overtime by instructing them to not record hours,
changing their time sheets, giving paid time off instead of overtime
pay, requiring them to work during unpaid breaks, or misclassifying
them as exempt from the overtime requirements. 82 To prove com-
monality, the plaintiffs offered declarations from approximately 10%
of the class to establish that the bank's uniform and unwritten policy
led to a systematic denial of overtime compensation.83 The bank ar-
gued that commonality was lacking because plaintiffs alleged that it
denied overtime compensation in four distinct manners.8 4 The Sev-
enth Circuit disagreed: "Although there might be slight variations in
how Charter One enforced its overtime policy, both classes maintain a
common claim that Charter One broadly enforced an unlawful policy
denying employees earned-overtime compensation. This unofficial
policy is the common answer that potentially drives the resolution of
this litigation. ' 85 The Seventh Circuit also concluded that the prob-
lematic circumstances in Dukes were not present. 86
79. See, e.g., Bailiff, 2011 WL 6318953, at *3 (finding that plaintiffs established commonality in
a due process case because all arrestees paid the allegedly unconstitutional booking fee).
80. Ross, 667 F.3d at 909 (finding that plaintiffs proved commonality in a wage and hour act
case notwithstanding four different methods by which defendant denied overtime
compensation).
81. Jamie S., 668 F.3d at 498 (finding commonality lacking when class members suffered injury
at different stages of a process that was established by a statutory scheme); Groussman v. Motor-
ola, Inc., No. 10 C 911, 2011 WL 5554030, at *3-4 (N.D. Il. Nov. 15, 2011) (finding commonality
lacking in an ERISA case filed on behalf of 401(k) plan participants due to variations in the
timing of and reasons for participants' investment decisions).
82. See Ross, 667 F.3d at 908-09.
83. Id. at 909.
84. Id.
85. Id. (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011)).
86. Id. While the Dukes class had 1.5 million class members in a nationwide class, and the
need to ascertain the discriminatory mental state of thousands of decision makers, the Ross class
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While the facts in a particular case may be distinguishable from
Dukes, the courts will still focus on the three-step commonality analy-
sis espoused in Dukes.87 At least one court has concluded that, in
"Dukes, the Supreme Court indicated that a plaintiff must do more
than simply point to some questions of fact or law relevant to poten-
tial class members or a common nucleus of operative fact,"'88 although
the Seventh Circuit appears to have rejected this interpretation. 89
Therefore, litigants should focus their commonality arguments on the
language employed by the Supreme Court in Dukes.
V. "PREDOMINANCE" HAS NOT BEEN ALTERED BY DUKES
Dukes narrows the universe of common questions appropriate
under Rule 23(a)(2), but it does not alter the predominance analysis
under Rule 23(b)(3). In Messner, for example, the Seventh Circuit set
forth the standard for predominance without citing Dukes and, in-
stead, cited earlier Supreme Court decisions. "Analysis of predomi-
nance under Rule 23(b)(3) 'begins, of course, with the elements of the
underlying cause of action,"' 90 and "trains on the legal or factual
questions that qualify each class member's case as a genuine contro-
versy." 91 This standard is "readily met in cases alleging consumer or
securities fraud or violations of the antitrust laws."'92 Common ques-
tions are those that can be answered with "the same evidence" for
"each member" of the class; individual questions are those that re-
quire evidence that "varies from member to member. ' 93 Predomi-
nance exists "when 'common questions represent a significant aspect
of [a] case and . . . can be resolved for all members of [a] class in a
single adjudication. '94
Dukes' commonality analysis focused on the central merits question
of whether a uniform gender discrimination policy exists. This focus
might create an expectation that more proof on the merits is now re-
had 1,129 members in one state, and no need to ascertain the state of mind of decision makers.
Id.
87. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2591, 2550-51 (2011).
88. Groussman v. Motorola, Inc., No. 10 C 911, 2011 WL 5554030, at *3 (N.D. I11. Nov. 15,
2011).
89. See Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 815 (7th Cir. 2012),
("[C]ommon questions can predominate if a common nucleus of operative facts and issues un-
derlies the claims .... " (internal quotation marks omitted)).
90. Id. (quoting Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2184 (2011)).
91. Id. at 814 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521
U.S. 591, 623 (1997)).
92. Id. at 815 (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
93. Id. (citing Blades v. Monsanto Co., 400 F.3d 562, 566 (8th Cir. 2005)).
94. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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quired to establish predominance. In Messner, however, the Seventh
Circuit rejected this expectation: "The district court misapplied Rule
23(b)(3)'s predominance standard when it made" proof of antitrust
impact "a condition for class certification. ' 95 "Under the proper stan-
dard, plaintiff's 'burden at the class certification stage [was] not to
prove the element of antitrust impact,' but only to 'demonstrate that
the element of antitrust impact is capable of proof at trial through evi-
dence that is common to the class rather than individual to its
members.' "96
A. Defenses May Play a More Prominent Role in Predominance
In Dukes, the Supreme Court rejected a class certification model in
which the defendant would be precluded from asserting affirmative
defenses. 97 The Court's discussion focused initially on Rule 23(b)(2)
certification in Title VII cases that involved claims for monetary relief
(backpay), but it evolved into a broader statement concerning the role
of affirmative defenses in class certification. 98 The Court concluded
that because the "Rules Enabling Act forbids interpreting Rule 23 'to
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right,' a class cannot be
certified on the premise that Wal-Mart will not be entitled to litigate
its statutory defenses to individual claims." 99 Courts have interpreted
this analysis as supporting the proposition that affirmative defenses
may defeat predominance when "[i]nvestigating and litigating each of
[defendant's] potential defenses ... as to each individual class mem-
ber would require numerous mini-trials."'100 Accordingly, after
Dukes, the courts may focus more attention on affirmative defenses
when addressing predominance.
B. Complex Damage Determinations Still Do Not
Defeat Predominance
Dukes disapproved the trial-by-formula approach adopted by the
district court, in which a subset of the class claims would be tried, and
the percentage of successful claimants would be multiplied by the av-
95. Messner, 669 F.3d at 818.
96. Id. (quoting Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d 182, 197 (3d Cir. 2011)); see also id. at
816 ("[P]laintiffs had to show that it was possible to use common evidence to prove that [defen-
dant's conduct] injured members of the proposed class.").
97. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2560-61 (2011).
98. See id. at 2561.
99. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006)).
100. Witt v. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C., 276 F.R.D. 458, 469-70 (E.D. Tex. 2011) (deny-
ing class certification in a case involving affirmative defenses to breach of contract claims arising
from highly individualized, nonstandardized mineral lease agreements).
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erage recovery awarded to yield the entire class recovery. t l The
Court held that such an approach would enlarge or modify substantive
rights in contravention of the Rules Enabling Act. 102 While the dis-
cussion was limited to the proposed Rule 23(b)(2) employment dis-
crimination class, the discussion could be interpreted more broadly as
defeating predominance in Rule 23(b)(3) damage classes in which
complex individual damage determinations are required.
In Messner, the Seventh Circuit rejected this interpretation and con-
cluded that "it is well established that the presence of individualized
questions regarding damages does not prevent certification under
Rule 23(b)(3).' ' t0 3 The Seventh Circuit rejected the trial court's con-
clusion that proof of highly individualized damages defeated predomi-
nance: "Under the district court's approach, Rule 23(b)(3) would
require not only common evidence and methodology, but also com-
mon results for members of the class. That approach would come very
close to requiring common proof of damages for class members, which
is not required. 10 4 Accordingly, Dukes supports the well-settled prin-
ciple that even highly individualized damage determinations do not
defeat predominance, at least according to the Seventh Circuit.
In Comcast, the Supreme Court addressed damages issues in the
context of a Rule 23(b)(3) class action. As noted above, the Supreme
Court held that plaintiffs' damage model did not establish that dam-
ages could be measured on a classwide basis because it did not isolate
the alleged misconduct at issue.10 5 A "model purporting to serve as
evidence of damages ... must measure only those damages attributa-
ble to" the misconduct at issue. 10 6 "[A]t the class-certification stage
(as at trial), any model supporting a plaintiff's damages case must be
consistent with its liability case."' 07
VI. CONCLUSION
Dukes impacts all class certification decisions. Even if Dukes is dis-
tinguishable on its facts, the principles set forth by the Supreme Court
apply generally to the Rule 23 requirements. Defendants will no
doubt cite Dukes because it is a Supreme Court decision that reversed
101. See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2561.
102. Id.
103. Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 815 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2558).
104. Id. at 819.
105. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1431-35 (2012).
106. Id. at 1433.
107. Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted).
2013]
692 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:675
class certification. Plaintiffs should rely on Dukes too, however, be-
cause it sets forth several principles that militate in favor of class
certification.
